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Introduction
While much work has been done in recent decades to restore the centrality
of beauty to its rightful place in constructive theology, such an aesthetic turn,
as I will note in this article, is far from problem-free. Specifically, suspicions
about the ideological character of aesthetics have been voiced by a number
of postmodern thinkers, for whom the identification of beauty and justice—
already present in pre-Socratic cosmogonies—is irrevocably dissolved. The
broader assumption underwriting my approach is that such dislocations of
beauty from goodness, when transposed to the religious sphere, are but
contemporary modulations of the “Great Controversy” theme central to
Seventh-day Adventist theology and piety.1 After delineating the basic contours
of this problematic, I will turn to Jonathan Edwards’s Trinitarian aesthetics
and its rich relational ontology in an attempt to provide a constructive
engagement with these issues. While retaining reservations about certain
aspects of his thought, I will nevertheless suggest that his understanding of
the nature of true beauty adds an important voice to current debates. In the
final section of the article, I will turn to a theological interpretation of Andrei
Rublev’s Trinity icon as a form of art to help me further elaborate on Edwards’s
proposal, eventually pointing to the biblical Sabbath as a possible focal point
for a distinctive Adventist approach to theological aesthetics. The account of
theodramatic beauty that will be articulated in that context, furnishes us with a
credible apologetic platform from which a response to (postmodern) qualms
about the ethical viability of beauty can be cogently crafted.
Genealogies of Beauty
“We can be sure that whoever sneers at [beauty’s] name as if she were an
ornament of a bourgeois past . . . can no longer pray and soon will no longer
be able to love,”2 so writes Hans Urs von Balthasar in the opening pages of his
1
The “Great Controversy” concept as present in Adventist discourse is a
shorthand expression for the cosmological conflict between good and evil as evidenced
in salvation history.
2
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 1:
Seeing the Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, ed. Joseph Fessio and John Riches (San
Francisco: Ignatius, 1982), 18.
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magnum opus, The Glory of the Lord. With a virtually unmatched erudition and
depth of insight, Balthasar weaves an intricate philosophical, theological, and
historical account, tracing the marginalization of beauty in Christian theology.
He observes how, among other things, “the word ‘aesthetic’ automatically
flows from the pens of both Protestant and Catholic writers when they want
to describe an attitude which, in the last analysis, they find to be frivolous,
merely curious and self-indulgent.”3 Balthasar laments such deaesthetization of
theology and its adverse effects on the Christian practices of worship, spiritual
formation, and evangelism. After all, he argues, “in a world without beauty . . .
the good also loses its attractiveness, self-evidence why it must be carried out.”
Why not prefer evil over good? “Why not investigate Satan’s depth?”4
Fortunately, much has changed in regard to the treatment of beauty as
a key theological category since Balthasar first voiced his clarion call. The
steady outflow of scholarly literature dealing with various questions of
theological aesthetics clearly attests to an increased attention given to this
important conundrum.5 Yet the evocation of beauty for Christian theology
remains fraught with significant challenges. The rejection of beauty in
favor of the postmodern sublime, the commodification of beauty in our
hypersignified culture, the mass media diffusion of the aesthetic ideal into
an “absolute and unstoppable polytheism of Beauty,”6 the feminist critique
of beauty as a vestige of patriarchal exploitation, the Protestant suspicions
of beauty as a “meretricious Hellenistic import,”7 the sociohistorical location
of taste, the unavoidable dialectic of subjective/objective entailed in any
aesthetic perception, the frequent degeneration of beauty into self-indulgent
sentimentality8—these and other sardonic dismissals present serious
challenges of how to speak of beauty in any meaningful way. Beauty is simply
too nebulous, as it seems, too tame, too easily complicit with oppression and
evil, too escapist in the face of rampant injustice to be able to function as a
Ibid., 1:51.
Ibid., 1:19.
5
Note, e.g., Edward Farley, Faith and Beauty: A Theological Aesthetic (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2001); Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and
Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John Navone, Toward a Theology of Beauty
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996); Jeremy Begbie, Resounding Truth: Christian Witness
in the World of Music (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007).
6
Umberto Eco, History of Beauty, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Rizzoli,
2004), 428.
7
Patrick Sherry, “The Beauty of God the Holy Spirit,” Theology Today 64 (2007):
12.
8
Jeremy Begbie offers a helpful delineation of sentimentality in “Beauty,
Sentimentality, and the Arts,” in The Beauty of God: Theology and the Arts, ed. Mark
Husbands, Daniel J. Treier, and Roger Lundin (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2006).
3
4
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central theological category. It would thus appear that in contrast to the other
two transcendentals—the truth and the good—beauty is not in the position
to claim invariable and unconditional beneficence.9 As Roman Guardini
rightly puts it, “Beauty ought to be reserved only for that which is valid, good,
and true, and in a certain sense it is so—but the other aspect of beauty is also
undeniable and disturbing, namely that it is not in fact so, and that it can shine
forth in evil, in disorder, in indifference, and even in stupidity.”10
The tenuous way in which beauty and justice are related is well illustrated,
in Peter Cohen’s documentary, The Architecture of Doom, in which the
calamitous connection of beauty and evil is hauntingly explored. More than
just chronicling the different ways in which art both reflected and informed
the Weltanschauung of the Nazi elite, the film is a well-documented exposé
of National Socialism as a “pervasive manifestation of a perverse aesthetic
doctrine: to make the world beautiful by doing violence to it.”11 As Cohen
poignantly shows, the concoction of Hitler’s genocidal madness led him to
decry “doom as art’s highest expression.” What a triumph of the grotesque!
No special measure of moral astuteness is required to tag such a chilling
amorality of beauty as positively deviant and ghastly.
Given this and other, perhaps less drastic, examples of the misuse of
beauty, it does not come as a surprise that some postmodern thinkers are highly
suspicious of rhetorical sublimations of beauty, seeing them as invariably
doomed to deconstructive implosions. In response, various “detoxification
therapies” are proposed intent on uncovering the interplay of vested interests
embedded in ostensibly innocuous appeals to beauty.12 Pierre Bourdieu’s
sociological analysis, for example, leads him to assert that the aesthetic sphere
is never one of innocent enjoyment and simple human pleasure. Aesthetics
is always deeply political in that a set of values is established “according to
which the dominant class automatically comes out on top. Their political and
natural supremacy is recast as natural supremacy.”13 Given the exploitative
For an illuminating account of how beauty came to be considered as one of the
transcendentals of being during the Middle Ages, see Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in
the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), chap. 2.
10
Romano Guardini, Dostoevsky: Il mondo religioso, 4th ed. (Bresica: Morcelliana,
1995), 289, cited in Bruno Forte, The Portal of Beauty: Towards a Theology of Aesthetics,
trans. David Glenday and Paul McPartlan (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 45. Again,
this is not a novel observation. Already in Leonardo da Vinci we find the statement
that “beauty is not always good.” See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics,
trans. Adam and Ann Czerniawski (New York: Continuum, 2005), 3:131.
11
Benjamin Forgey, “The Architecture of Doom,” Washington Post, 22 February
1992.
12
See Farley, 7.
13
John Armstrong, The Secret Power of Beauty: Why Happiness Is in the Eye of the
Beholder (New York: Penguin, 2004), 98. For an extended discussion of this issue,
9
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character of the aesthetic, even seemingly laudatory endeavors such as art
education, have a menacing undertone to them. The very cultivation of art
means that we are “constructing a cruel instrument for exclusion. In loving
beauty we are not—as we may have innocently supposed—doing something
essentially good.”14 Beauty, in other words, is not what it appears to be.
Admittedly, I find much sympathy with such cautionary remarks,
particularly when broader issues of economic exploitation are brought to
the table. The project of genealogical uncovering is certainly not inimical to
the task of Christian theology; in fact, it is principally invited and welcomed
by it. After all, Christianity is a religion informed by a deep realism about
the fallenness of the world and its proclivities to violence and untruth,
and, as such, carries a strong presumption against viewing reality, including
beauty, through rose-tinted glasses. My reservations begin to emerge,
however, when such deconstructive strategies become hostage to forms
of essentialist discourse—“such and such always amounts to such and
such”—and, in the process, succumb to an unmitigated apotheosis of scope
that posits strife and malevolence as foundational cosmic principles.
Gilles Deleuze serves as a case in point. In his nocturnal revisionism, the
apocalyptic vision of the New Jerusalem becomes an ultimate embodiment
of panoptical oppression. Its streets of gold and precious stones amount
to nothing less than an “architecture of doom”—a ploy intended to hide
the fact of an “all-encompassing control of society by the state.” 15 Thus
what Christians would see as embodying the ultimate outpouring of divine
benevolence is stunningly transmuted into or “uncovered” as the final
takeover of a totalitarian regime; an apokalypsis indeed. Deleuze writes:
The Apocalypse is not a concentration camp (Antichrist); it is the
great military, police, and civil security of the new State (the Heavenly
Jerusalem). . . . The New Jerusalem, with its wall and its great street of
glass, is an architectural terror. . . . Involuntarily, the Apocalypse at least
persuades us that what is most terrifying is not the Antichrist, but this new
city descended from heaven, the holy city “prepared like a bride adorned
for her husband.” All relatively healthy readers of the Apocalypse will feel
they are already in the lake of sulfur.16
see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984). See also Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
14
Armstrong, 98.
15
Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness,
and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 287.
16
Gilles Deleuze, “Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos,”
in Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). Cf.
Volf, 287.
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It does not take much to see the specter of Friedrich Nietzsche looming
here in a menacing fashion. After all, for him Christianity’s self-presentation as
an announcement of peace masks a sinister calculus at work, camouflaging as
a “will to power at its most vulgar and debased: power representing itself as
the refusal of power, as the negation of strife, as the evangel of perfect peace—
only in order to make itself stronger, more terrifying, more invincible.”17
Such a stance is understandable in light of Nietzsche’s genealogy that renders
“every regime of power as necessarily unjust. . . . No universals are ascribed to
human society save one: that it is always a field of warfare.”18 In contemporary
philosophy such deconstructive suspicions are expressed by Jacques Derrida,
who claims that any act of hospitality, regardless of its aesthetic appeal,
inevitably hides subterranean proclivities toward violence and exclusion.
Hospitality, and more fundamentally giving, is always a part, however oblique,
of an “economy of exchange” that is never fully extricated from narcissistic
impulses. Clearly, the wider philosophical assumption at work here is that the
moment you have a concrete expectation, a determinate future, or the moment
you speak about a definite “presence”—in other words, the moment you have
any sort of determinacy of content, being, proclamation, or expectation—the
shadow of totality emerges. Thus John Caputo’s claim that he cannot envision
“how any religious tradition or theological language can take shape without
violence,”19 because “as soon as a confession or institution takes on a particular,
determinate shape, it is necessarily exclusionary and therefore violent.”20
One cannot but see these sentiments pointing in the direction of
Genesis 3—I am speaking hyperbolically here, of course. There the serpent’s
strategy, part of it anyway, is one of dislodging beauty from the idea of a
primordial good or hospitality21 only to be cast as an ideological cover for
17
David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 102.
18
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1991), 281-282. For an extended treatment of Nietzsche’s version of “piety”
and “redemption,” see Bruce Ellis Benson, Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); and Giles Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche:
On the Piety of Unbelief (London: Routledge, 2002).
19
John D. Caputo, “What Do I Do When I Love My God? Deconstruction
and Radical Orthodoxy,” in Questioning God, ed. Michael Scanlon, John D. Caputo,
and Mark Dooley (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 307, cited in
James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 116.
20
Smith, 116. This is Smith’s restatement of Caputo’s position.
21
As I will develop it more clearly in the subsequent section of this article, I
am employing the world “hospitality” to name concrete actualizations of benevolent
intent.
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oppressive intent.22 God’s gifting, so it is argued, is simply a modality of
seductive beauty; an exercise in hypernarcissism, hiding stratified proclivities
toward totalitarian domination. Thus in Gen 3:1 we find, however implicitly,
a primordial transvaluation of beauty. Yes, the garden is beautiful; you may
enjoy its harmonious fruitfulness; yes, you are free to delight in its pleasureaffording richness, but beware! All of it simply masks a sinister antihumanistic
ontotheology, a veritable “architecture of doom.” Do not be tricked by the
ultimate Purveyor of “Turkish Delight”—to evoke C. S. Lewis’s famed The
Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe for a moment. The hospitality offered by
the White Witch is but a subterfuge of an “omnivorous empire”23 built on
“original strife.” Adam and Eve, of course, assent to the serpent’s twisted
“genealogy”—an act of a proto-Nietzschean deconstruction one could say—
and the rest is, pun intended, (human) history.
Undoubtedly, these issues concerning the relationship of aesthetic
persuasion and agential intent are of enormous significance not only for
theology, but for Christian praxis as well. As one can easily attest, scarcely
any element of the church’s apologetic, kerygmatic, diaconical, missional, and
formative task is left untouched by some modulation of this problematic.
After all, the deep underlying issue here—the correlation of God and human
flourishing—is one that profoundly informs all these considerations and
endeavors.24 With that in mind, a number of questions need to be addressed:
What is the relationship of the good and the beautiful, if any? What do we
mean by beauty and, specifically, the “beauty of the Lord”? Is an apologetics
of beauty possible at all? After all, “who is to say,” to borrow from Hart,
“that the beautiful is self-evidently free of violence or subterfuge? How can
one plausibly argue that ‘beauty’ does not serve the very strategy of power to
which it supposedly constitutes an alternative?”25
Quite clearly, it is impossible to address the full range of those concerns
here. My goal is a more modest one in that I simply want to suggest one
possible, yet hopefully plausible approach. Specifically, I want to engage some
key insights of Edwards’s Trinitarian aesthetics as they pertain to the topic at
hand. As is widely known, the relationship of the good and the beautiful as
it relates to the doctrine of God and to wider metaphysical considerations is
22
See, e.g., Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo,
trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 75ff.
23
Hart, 2.
24
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to engage more fully the seminal
study by Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Some of the central claims of this article deeply
resonate with his account of moral and nonmoral excellencies in relation to God as
the ultimate Good.

Hart, 4.

25
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something that occupied Edwards for the better part of his life. My broader
goal in doing so here is to propose a conceptual appropriation of a traditional
Adventist philosophy of history—in the sense of a harmonious and faithful
development of its thematic cantus firmus—in order to unearth some plausible
ways in which its theological and philosophical markers might be employed to
address postmodern critiques of Christian metadiscourse and its incarnational
particularity.
Jonathan Edwards’s Vision of Hospitable Beauty
In his helpful overview of theological aesthetics, Faith and Beauty, Edward
Farley notes how in Edwards’s thought
beauty is more central and more pervasive than in any other text in the
history of Christian theology. Edwards does not just theologize about
beauty: beauty (loveliness, sweetness) is the fundamental motif through
which he understands the world, God, virtue and ‘divine things.’26

Roland Delattre seconds this observation when he writes that
“beauty is one of the things Jonathan Edwards was most concerned with
understanding.”27 For Edwards beauty is “the first principle of being,” “the
measure and objective foundation of the perfection of being—of excellence,
goodness, and value,” “the first among the perfections of God,” “a major
clue to his doctrine of the Trinity” as well as his anthropology, “the central
clue to the meaning of conversion” and personal holiness, and the nature of
true virtue.28 In other words, beauty for Edwards is not simply incidental to
how we are to think about the nature and character of God, or the structure
of reality in general. Rather, it should be seen as the key ontological category
through which other coordinates of being, such as unity, truth, and goodness
are mapped out.
As is widely known, Edwards’s intricate theological aesthetics rests on
a differentiation between two kinds of beauty. First, he posits a secondary
or natural beauty that greatly resembles the “great theory” in aesthetics,29
famously encapsulated in Thomas Aquinas’s definition of beauty as integrity
or completeness (integritas), right proportion or harmony (proportio), and
radiance or resplendence (claritas).30 Edwards defines secondary beauty as
Farley, 43.
Roland André Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1.
28
See ibid., 2.
29
See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, “The Great Theory of Beauty and Its Decline,”
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (1972), cited in Begbie, 20.
26
27

See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (Allen: Christian Classics, 1981), Ia, Q. 39, A. 8.
30

294

Seminary Studies 48 (Autumn 2010)

“mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity,
and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order,
uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc.”31 Notably, and I take this to
be an essential point, such beauty is manifested not only in material objects,
but also in the right-ordering of society and the practice of justice.32
That such beauty would possess a sacramental character is self-evident
to Edwards. His stand on this issue echoes a long intellectual tradition
resembling, among others, different modalities of Pythagorean, Platonic,
Neoplatonic, and, of course, Christian thought. Long indeed is the list of
philosophers and theologians who have reflected on beauty—specifically
transcendental beauty—as a sacramental manifestation of God’s presence,
variously articulating the core idea that “beauty happens when the Whole
offers itself in the fragment,”33 the idea that in encountering beauty, we
encounter, however dimly, the Source of beauty himself.34 The fifteenthcentury Neoplatonist Marsillio Ficino, for example, notes how “by its utility,
harmony, and decorativeness, the world testifies to the skill of the divine artist
and is proof that God is indeed its Maker.”35 Or perhaps one might recall the
well-known lines from George Herbert’s poem, “The Elixir”:
A man that looks on glass,
On it may stay his eye;
Or if he pleaseth, through it pass,
And then the heaven espy.36

Similarly, Edwards emphasizes the revelatory capacity of natural beauty
precisely because of its “resemblance of spiritual beauties.”37 In fact, “that
beauteous light with which the world is filled in a clear day is a lively shadow

Jonathan Edwards, “The Nature of True Virtue,” in Ethical Writings, ed. Paul
Ramsey, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989),
561-562.
32
See ibid., 568-570. This point will be elaborated at greater length below.
33
Forte, vii.
34
I am aware that this claim immediately thrusts one into the middle of the
longstanding debates surrounding, e.g., analogia entis versus analogia fidei, theologia gloriae
versus theologia crucis. Addressing this problematic, however, goes beyond the scope of
this article.
35
Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics, 102.
36
George Herbert, “The Elixir,” in The Complete English Poems (New York: Penguin,
2005), 174.
37
Jonathan Edwards, “The Beauty of the World,” in Scientific and Philosophical
Works, ed. Wallace E. Anderson, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2003), 305.
31
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of [Christ’s] spotless holiness and happiness, and delight in communicating
himself.”38
This, in brief, is how Edwards approaches natural beauty. As is well
known, however, he does not stop there. There is, after all, a need to speak
of beauty beyond the realm of mere material objects—a point, incidentally,
already made by thinkers such as Plotinus39 and Boethius.40 Such primary
or spiritual beauty, as Edwards calls it, bespeaks of the sort of “consent”
or “harmony” appropriate to moral agents, which he goes on to define as
“benevolence to Being in general”41—that is, a disposition of well-regard
not only to the immediate circle of natural bonds or self interests, but to
whatever there is. More than simply being a form of aesthetic sensibility,
therefore, beauty is rendered into “propensity and union of the heart to
being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will.”42
Beauty, accordingly, is not incidental to hospitality—by which I refer here
to phenomenological instantiations of benevolent intent—but is, in fact, its
desire-evoking “form” or embodiment. It is not something added to the good;
it is, with some reservation, to be identified with moral rightness or ethical
self-transcendence.43 In fact, Edwards’s entire aesthetic and metaphysical
edifice is built on the supposition that “the primary and original beauty or
excellence that is among minds [or moral agents] is love,”44 in other words,
benevolent relatedness. In Amy Plantinga Pauw’s words:
Beauty was irreducibly relational for Edwards. His aesthetics “does not,
therefore, begin with the assumption of the ontological independence of
38
Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” a-500, ed. Thomas A. Shafer, The Works
of Jonathan Edwards, 13 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), Misc. 108, 279. For
a discussion of how imagination and natural beauty reflect “higher realities,” see C. S.
Lewis, Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995),
167.
39
An interesting comparison, that cannot be developed here, is the one between
Edwards and Plotinus on the nature of soul beauty. While they operate on different
metaphysical assumptions, there are noteworthy similarities in their respective accounts.
For a helpful summary of Plotinus, see Armstrong, chap. 8. See also Farley, 20.
40
If “men had the use of Lynceus’ eyes,” writes Boethius, they would see that
Alcibiades, “so very handsome on the surface,” was, in fact, “totally ugly once his
inner parts came into view” (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy [New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999], III.8).
41
Edwards, “The Nature of True Virtue,” 540.
42
Ibid.
43
On the idea of “ethical self-transcendence,” see Farley, chap. 5.
44
Jonathan Edwards, “The Mind,” in Scientific and Philosophical Works, ed. Wallace
E. Anderson, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003), 363; cf. Amy Plantinga Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology
of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmands, 2000), 82.

296

Seminary Studies 48 (Autumn 2010)
the [beautiful] thing; it is not a thing first and only afterwards designated as
beautiful.” Rather, beauty is a matter of proportion and harmony within
the thing itself, and in its relations with other objects. . . . Anything that is
beautiful exhibits consent and agreement, and so must be [in Edwards’s
words] “distinguished in a plurality some way or other.” Beauty does require
complexity.45

That explains why, for Edwards, primary beauty by definition can never
remain purely internal, purely individualistic. The only exception to this
basic rule is the being of “God, Who is being-in-general, both the sum and
the fountain of all being” and, therefore, “has primary beauty internal to
Himself.”46 The Trinitarian subtext of Edwards’s thought comes clearly to the
fore here. Since “there is true ‘plurality’ in God,” as Pauw puts it, “there can
be consent and thus true beauty within the Trinity itself. God’s ‘infinite beauty
is his infinite mutual love of himself.’”47
What becomes evident in this context is that Edwards’s metaphysics
rests on a dynamic reciprocation at the heart of divine and human gifting.
He believes that “in the framework of desire that all creatures possess, selflove is a logically necessary and unavoidable desire that accompanies any
attraction, that is, all love is a reflexive desire and need for something that
we find lovely, worthy, valuable, pleasant or beautiful.”48 Far from being an
instantiation of psychological egoism or mercenary interestedness, therefore,
such appropriate self-love is implicit in this ontology of participation. It is
this point that is repeatedly stressed in Edwards’s Dissertation,49 where God’s
self-glorification is postulated as the ultimate end of creation. To the charge
that such claims present a thoroughly narcissistic and megalomaniacal God,
Edwards simply responds that such a critique quite wrongly feeds off a barren
image of potentia Dei absoluta, betraying a loss of theological nerve at a crucial
point. For him, to restate the point already made, divine self-regard is a form
of ethical self-transcendence that is synonymous with benevolent consent.
God is most passionate about his glory, but what characterizes that glory is
a donative disposition toward his creation. That is to say, God’s self-regard

Pauw, 81. The reference in this paragraph is to Stephen H. Daniel, The Philosophy
of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in Diverse Semiotics (Bloomington: University of Indiana
Press, 1994), 182.
46
Delattre, 18.
47
Pauw, 83. The reference in this paragraph is to Edwards, “The Mind,” 363.
48
William J. Danaher, The Trinitarian Ethics of Jonathan Edwards (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 2004), 24.
49
Jonathan Edwards, “Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God Created
the World,” in Ethical Writings, ed. Paul Ramsey, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 8 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
45
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and kenotic other-regard perfectly coincide in Edwards’s metaphysical and
theological scheme.50
A point of practical intent is worth stressing here. One of the reasons
why Edwards is so intent on seeking after beauty is because it points to the
proper modality of knowing God. He variously writes of such knowledge as
having a “real sense,” “heart knowledge,” or true “apprehension” of the inner
beauty of God as contrasted to a mere noetic grasp. Consider, for example, the
following statement from his sermon “A Divine and Supernatural Light”:
There is a twofold understanding or knowledge of good that God has made
the mind of man capable of. The first, that which is merely speculative or
notional: as when a person only speculatively judges. . . . And the other is
that which consists in the sense of the heart: as when there is a sense of the
beauty, amiableness, or sweetness of a thing; so that the heart is sensible of
pleasure and delight in the presence of the idea of it.51

Balthasar’s own phenomenology of spiritual sight strongly resonates with
Edwards’s sentiments on this issue. For him, “there is something provocative
and disturbing about the truly beautiful; it cannot simply be admired blandly
but must be seen and taken in, dealt with.”52 Attraction and assent are fused, so
to speak, in the moment of perception. Thus the arresting appeal of beauty
fosters a grammar of ocular metanoia, a conversion of sight, that is, where
the beauty of the Christian gospel overwhelms us with its suasive loveliness,
gracing us with “the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face
of Jesus Christ” (2 Cor. 4:6). Here apologetics is “not so much arguing as
showing.”53 In Balthasar’s words (summarizing Pseudo-Dionysius’s position):
“No explanation can help him who does not see the beauty [of God]; no
‘proof of the existence of God’ can help him who cannot see what is manifest
to the world; no apologetic can be any use to him for whom the truth that
radiates from the center of theology is not evident.”54 In pursuing that line of
thought, Balthasar sides with Augustine’s contention in his De Libero Arbitrio
For a helpful development of this theme, see Farley, 89.
Jonathan Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” in Sermons and Discourses
1730-1733, ed. Mark Valeri, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 14 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999), 413-414.
52
Robert Barron, And Now I See: A Theology of Transformation (New York: Crossway,
1998), 71.
53
Edward T. Oakes, “The Apologetics of Beauty,” in The Beauty of God: Theology
and the Arts, ed. Mark Husbands, Daniel J. Treier, and Roger Lundin (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity, 2006), 212.
54
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 2,
Studies in Theological Styles—Clerical Styles, trans. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh,
and Brian McNeil, ed. Joseph Fessio and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1983),
166.
50
51
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(On Free Choice) that theology proper is apologetics; once we “see” God for
who he is in his beauty and glory, Augustine argues, all objections to God fall
away. To this point, Edwards would gladly accede.
To summarize, Edwards presents a complex metaphysics in which the
idea of beauty plays a key role in the apprehension of Being as good. His
version of the “erotics of redemption,”55 rooted in the idea of an eternal
consent of being to being within the immanent Trinity, doxologically fuses the
elements of beauty and goodness into a cosmic vision of kenotic hospitality.
As he so eloquently states in his Dissertation:
God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his creatures: because
the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in
himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and
happiness of his creature. And that in communicating his fullness for them,
he does it for himself: because their good, which he seeks, is so much in
union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and
happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of God’s glory: God,
in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself,
i.e. himself diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his
own beauty and fullness), he seeks their glory and happiness.56

To this vision of God, I readily assent. On a more critical note, however,
I feel that a stronger Christological basis would have strengthened Edwards’s
argument considerably. I do not intend to suggest that Christology is entirely
absent from his aesthetics—one needs only to recall his landmark sermon,
“The Excellencies of Christ”—but I do wish there was a stronger narrative
component to his edifice. After all, the best response that Christianity can
give to the subversive logic of those such as Nietzsche and Deleuze is
one that comes in the form of an alternative story, a cruciform aesthetics,
a metanarrative of self-giving love dramatically enacted in “God with us,”
attesting to the unselfing hospitality of the triune God. I take this to be a point
of great importance, and it is one that I would like to develop further through
an examination of Andrei Rublev’s painting, Trinity (ca. 1410 a.d.). While it
is impossible to here do justice to Orthodox iconographic history with its
various renderings and interpretations of Genesis 18 (the story of Abraham’s
visitation by the three heavenly beings at Mamre), I will nevertheless utilize
some of the icon’s profound symbolism to engage some of the central planks
of Edwards’s vision.
God’s Iconic Gesture
Pavel Florensky, in his Iconostasis, offers the following “irrefutable” argument
for the existence of God: “There exists the icon of the Trinity by St Andrei
See Graham Ward, Cities of God (New York: Routledge, 2000), 182-202.
Edwards, “Dissertation,” 459.

55
56

The Architecture of Beneficence . . .

299

Rublev; therefore, God exists.”57 Setting aside the validity of such a “proof ”
for a moment, intriguing as it is, the theological and spiritual appeal of this
fifteenth-century icon is undeniable. Undoubtedly the highest expression of
Russian Orthodox iconography, the Trinity symbolically represents some of
the essential elements of Christian trinitarian theology and aesthetics.58 In
it, the ousia of the triune God is represented by the three hypostases of the
Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, viewed from left to right. The three
persons of the Trinity are perfectly contained within the circumference of a
circle, thereby symbolizing the essential oneness of God. Each figure holds
a staff, a sign of authority; has hues of blue pointing to their eternity; and
overlapping wings communicating intimacy. They differ in the color of their
noninterchangeable garments (chiton and clamys) that point to the glory of the
Father (pale purple interspersed with hues of gold), the royalty and suffering
of the Son (purple with a golden clavus), and the life-giving mission of the
Spirit (green). Additionally, there is a table (representing fellowship)—or
rather an altar, giving the icon a liturgical cast—a house (representing the fact
that “In my Father’s house there are many mansions”), a tree (symbolizing
the cross), and a cracked rock (implying the outflowing of water by the Spirit
of life). In other words, the table, or the space of fellowship, exists for us
as a possibility only because of the willingness of the primordial love to go
beyond itself and desire the presence of an “other.”
As we contemplate the theological meaning of the icon, we are pointed
to the idea of divine bounteousness, where the ecstatic (ek-stasis) rhythm of
God’s bullitio (immanent “boiling”) and ebullutio (economic “boiling over”)
is rooted in an aesthetics of benevolent desire.59 This notion is beautifully
articulated in Canto XIX of Dante’s Paradiso, where Dante finds himself in
the Primum Mobile, the ninth sphere of heaven. He is addressed by his guide,
Beatrice (divine grace), who attests that God does not create to “increase [his]
good, . . . but that reflections of his reflection might declare ‘I am.’”60 Thus
contra Derrida, God’s “gift” of creation is not an exercise of hypernarcissism,
but rather a bestowal of superabundant goodness through an act of aesthetic
Pavel Florensky, Iconostasis, trans. Donald Sheehan and Olga Andrejev
(Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996), 68, cited in Gabriel Bunge, The Rublev
Trinity: The Icon by the Monk-Painter Andrei Rublev, trans. Andrew Louth (Crestwood: St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2007), 107.
58
For further insights into Rublev’s icons, cf. Jim Forest, “Through Icons: Words
and Image Together,” in Beholding the Glory: Incarnation through the Arts, ed. Jeremy
Begbie (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 91-93.
59
For a discussion of bullitio and ebullitio in the theology of Meister Eckhart, see
Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart: The Man from Whom God Hid
Nothing (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 72ff.
60
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy: Paradiso, trans. John Ciardi (New York: New
American Library, 2003), XXIX, 10-18.
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excess. That, of course, is one of Edwards’s main contentions. As we have
noted in our discussion above, Edwards points to God’s self-glorification as
the ultimate “end” (terminus) of creation. The potential charge of divine selfabsorption is fundamentally subverted by identifying God’s glory and beauty
precisely with that of self-giving love. After all, for Edwards, “God’s beauty
consists in the first instance . . . not in His seeking, receiving, or loving beauty
but in His exhibiting, communicating, and bestowing beauty by his love of
being.”61
This relationship of beauty and benevolent intent or “virtue” seems
to be additionally enforced in the Rublev icon through the seemingly
laconic gesture by the middle angelic figure (the Son) pointing toward the
cup entailing a lamb’s head.62 It is in that gesture, it would seem, that a link
between the immanent and economic Trinity is provided, reminding us that
the symmetry of beauty and goodness is established foremost through the
historical enactment of God’s theodrama; a redemptive “play” in and through
which beauty is “performed for us” with the climax being the three days of
Easter.63 Accordingly, in seeking to provide a Christian account of primary
beauty we are not permitted to flinch from the index finger of John the
Baptist—to appropriate Karl Barth’s meditation on Matthias Grünewald’s
Isenheim Altarpiece for a moment here64—pointing to the crucified Christ.
Paradoxically it is there, in the very formlessness of beauty, that the “consent
of Being to being” is most clearly exhibited, giving the divine emanation—
that selfless outpouring of the triune God as the bonum est diffusivum sui (the
self-diffusive Good)—its full revelatory expression. In that sense, Rublev’s
icon reminds us that Christ is indeed “God’s greatest form of art,”65 “the
transcendent archetype of all worldly and human beauty.”66 In truth,
the church has no arguments for its faith more convincing than the form
of Christ. . . . Christian thought must remain immovably fixed alongside
Christ, in his irreducible particularity. . . . What Christian thought offers the
world is not a set of “rational” arguments that (suppressing certain of their
premises) force assent from others by leaving them, like the interlocutors
of Socrates, at a loss for words; rather, it stands before the world principally
with the story it tells concerning God and creation, the form of Christ, the
Delattre, 169.
For a Pentecost-centered interpretation of the icon, see Bunge, 79.
63
Begbie, 22. Not, of course, as the terminus of redemption, but as the true
foundation of glorification.
64
See, e.g., Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans.
Harold Knight G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 1.2:125.
65
Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Revelation and the Beautiful,” in Explorations in
Theology: The Word Made Flesh (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989), 117.
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61
62

The Architecture of Beneficence . . .

301

loveliness of the practice of Christian charity—and the rhetorical richness
of its idiom. Making its appeal first to the eye and heart, as the only way it
may “command” assent, the church cannot separate truth from rhetoric, or
from beauty.67

It becomes clearer at this point why the connection of primary and
secondary beauty is so central to Edwards. As discussed before, both represent
a certain kind of consent, an appealing harmoniousness of constitutive parts.
And again, the sort of harmoniousness that is proper to moral agents over
against inanimate objects is one that consists in benevolent intent. Thus for
Edwards, justice and beauty, ethics and aesthetics have a common ontological
grounding. The same way that “justice concerns right relationships,” so
also “the beauty God desires for the human community is the proper
dynamic ordering of lives in relation to each other. Justice is beautiful.” 68
That is to say, beauty and justice are deeply intertwined.69 Elaine Scarry
concurs when she claims that “beautiful things give rise to the notion of
distribution, to a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not just in the sense of
loveliness of aspect but in the sense of a symmetry of everyone’s relation to
one another.”70 Any treatment or evocation of natural beauty at the expense of
a wider transcendental nexus of values and excellencies presents a flattening
of vision that will always be susceptible to manipulation and misuse. While, to
the certain displeasure of most postmetaphysical philosophy, this is a recourse
to metadiscourse, it is one, I believe, that needs to be defended at all cost.71
Edwards, I think, would agree.
Finally, one of the more important symbolisms of the Rublev icon is
found in its inverted perspective in that its depth is not found behind the three
angelic figures, but in front of them, so to speak. It is as if we were invited
to step into the space, to join the table of the trinitarian fellowship. “God
draws near to us in such a way,” writes Thomas Torrance “as to draw us near
to himself within the circle of his knowing of himself.”72 It is an expression
of ultimate interestedness, but one that is liberating, fully actualizing, and
Hart, 3.
Begbie, 65.
69
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exponentially gracing. The idea of participation and theosis is clearly evoked
here, one that is pivotal to Edwards’s theological aesthetics. As noted above,
it is his contention that “God possesses an effulgent nature that emanates
throughout created existence and communicates to intelligent creatures the
desire for knowledge and union with God as the ground of all being.”73 After
all, as Edwards’s tirelessly emphasizes,
God’s respect to the creature’s good, and his respect to himself, is not a
divided respect; but both are united in one, as the happiness of the creature
aimed at is happiness in union with himself. The creature is no further happy
with this happiness which God makes his ultimate end than he becomes
one with God. The more happiness the greater union: when the happiness
is perfect, the union is perfect.74

It is there, in that “open space” of the icon, that the Sabbath as a symbol
of God’s availability becomes the heart of Rublev’s symbolic representation,
although not in the sense that he intended—the biblical doctrine of the
Sabbath most certainly was not at the forefront of his thought—but in the
sense that the Sabbath epitomizes the hospitable gesture at the focal point
of the icon. The Sabbath is the halo of that space, an intensified elaboration
of benevolent Infinity that gifts us with its kenotic immanence. As Jürgen
Moltmann puts it:
The Sabbath of God’s creation already contains in itself the redemptive
mystery of God’s indwelling in his creation, although—and just because—
he is wholly concentrated in himself and rests in himself. The works of
creation display in God’s act the Creator’s continual transcendence over his
creation. But the Sabbath of creation points to the Creator’s immanence in
his creation, In the Sabbath God joins his eternal presence to his temporal
creation and, by virtue of his rest, is there, with that creation and in it. . . .
[The] sabbath, in its peace and its silence, manifests the eternal God at once
exoterically and directly as the God who rests in his glory.75

It is in God’s rest that a completely new theme of liberating and
empowering gifting is being enacted. As the apex of God’s created work,
the final act of God’s creation, the Sabbath memorializes our dependence
on prevenient grace—totally irreconcilable with even a hint of meritorious
legalism—pointing to a God who creates, acts, invites, blesses, guides, sustains,
provides, sanctifies, and beautifies.76 As such, it radiates as an effulgent
backdrop to a peaceable metadiscourse, or rather metapraxis, enacted in
Danaher, 205.
Edwards, “Dissertation,” 533.
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“Immanuel—God with us.” The Sabbath is God’s dramatic response, so to
speak, to the serpent’s ideological deconstruction of primary beauty. That
is to say, it is both the formal and the material cause of an apologetics of
“showing”; a shape of performative theodicy fully to be realized only in “the
coming beauty of the kingdom of God.”77
Conclusion
In this article I have sought to address the following questions: How is one
to speak of God’s beauty when the very notion of aesthetic persuasion is
rendered into an ideological, violence-bent smokescreen? What place is there
for the aesthetics of faith when beauty is transmuted into a deceptive front
for the purpose of oppression, manipulation, duplicity, and totality? In other
words, how should one properly emulate the longing to “gaze at the beauty of
the Lord” (Ps 27:4) when the relationship of aesthetics and ethics is rendered
void? Admittedly, these are complicated issues, carrying the weight of a long
history of theological and philosophical reflections and thus need to be
approached with caution and interdisciplinary awareness. The strategy in this
article was to pursue two different tracks of reasoning. On one hand, I have
suggested that such deconstructive reservations are not necessarily inimical
to the Christian worldview and its account of human fallenness. Christianity
is a profoundly nonsentimental religion and is accordingly realistic about the
possibility of malformed beauty and the ways it might become implicated in
different forms of subjective, objective, and symbolic violence.78 One only
needs to recall Augustine’s Confessions, for example, and the way the dialectics
of seductive and benevolent beauty is played out in Augustine’s conversion
story.
At the same time, I have taken issue with those (postmodern) approaches
that axiomatically consign any form of (aesthetic) persuasion to violent
intent, however implicitly manifested. Quite apart from the question of
whether such postmetaphysical hermeneutics itself feeds off a cleverly
concealed “ontology of violence” (Milbank), I have attempted to provide
an account of nontotalitarian aesthetics within which God’s benevolence
is revealed as desire-evoking form (species) and splendor (lumen). Taking my
cue from Edwards’s account of primary beauty, I have tried to argue that a
Christian defense of the third transcendental cannot simply take the form
of a generalized philosophical aesthetics, but must remain irrevocably fixed
on God’s Trinitarian history of “God with us.” That is why in distinction
to Edwards—again, I take this to be more a matter of emphasis than
Jürgen Moltmann, “Messianic Lifestyle,” in The Passion for Life: A Messianic
Lifestyle (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 40.
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substance—I have tried to provide a more robust Christological foundation
to my account, that, together with Augustine,79 affirms that Christ’s kenosis
is the ultimate revelation of divine beauty and a theodramatic fusion of the
three transcendentals.
It should be clear by now, I trust, that I have simply tried to address
the “Great Controversy” problematic in a different key. After all, the “Great
Controversy” between good and evil revolves around the question of the
character of God in that his benevolent intent is creating, offering, promising,
proclaiming, and redeeming beauty—of which the Sabbath is the primordial
memorial—as evidenced in election, creation, redemption, and glorification.
So when we speak of a correlation of God and human flourishing, the
parameters of a humanistic God, the announcement of the evangel of peace—
in other words, all the multifaceted rhetorical and performative responses
of the Christian faith to various subversions of divine benevolence—we are
inevitably thrust into the realm of aesthetic discourse.
Of course, so much more could be added to this investigation. For one,
additional space is needed to provide more detailed phenomenological analyses
of beauty and justice and their respective interactions. Similarly, the question
of why a defense of benevolence should resort to an account of theological
aesthetics also deserves further exploration. That applies as well to various
issues concerning the subjective turn in aesthetics that are nibbling at the
outskirts of this problematic. In the meantime, however, I would like to simply
gesture toward Thomas Traherne’s words from his Centuries of Meditation, that
encapsulate the theological terminus toward which such explorations should
be ineluctably directed. What matters most, after all, is that
God is life eternal. There must therefore some exceeding great thing
be always attained in the knowledge of him. To know God is to know
goodness. It is to see the beauty of infinite love. . . . It is to see the king of
heaven and earth take infinite delight in giving. Whatever knowledge else
you have of God, it is but superstition. . . . He is not an object of terror, but
delight. To know him therefore, as he is, is to frame the most beautiful idea
in all world. He delights in our happiness more than we, and is of all other
the most lovely object.80
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